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Complementarities in information acquisition
with short-term trades
Christophe Chamley
Paris-Jourdan Sciences Économiques and Department of Economics, Boston University
In a ﬁnancial market where agents trade for short-term proﬁt and where news
can increase the uncertainty of the public belief, there are strategic complemen-
tarities in the acquisition of private information and, if the cost of information is
sufﬁciently small, a continuum of equilibrium strategies. Imperfect observation
of past prices reduces the continuum of Nash equilibria to a Strongly Rational-
Expectations Equilibrium. In that equilibrium, there are two sharply different
regimes for the evolution of the price, the volume of trade, and information ac-
quisition.
Keywords. Endogenous information, short-term gain, microstructure, strate-
gic complementarity, multiple equilibria, Strongly Rational-Expectations Equilib-
rium, trading frenzies.
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1. Introduction
In trading ﬁnancial assets, private information is valued because it enables traders to
“beat the market.” When more agents acquire information, this value is reduced by the
diffusion of the market. A formalization of this straightforward property is provided by
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) in a model where (i) agents hold their position until the
revelation of the fundamental value of the asset and (ii) the structure of information is
Gaussian.
Here, private information may be more valuable when more agents are informed.
The mechanism rests only on the informative properties of the market, with no struc-
tural payoff externality. Key assumptions are that agents hold their positions only for
the short-term and the structure of information is not Gaussian because some news can
increase uncertainty.
When agents trade for the short-run, what matters is not the fundamental but the
price of the asset in the near future. For private information to yield signiﬁcant proﬁt,
the price has to move in the near term. When the price is driven by the trades of in-
formed agents, a higher mass of these agents generates wider price movements, which
may enhance the value of private information.
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Two effects take place. First, more informed agents today drive the price closer
to the fundamental and reduce the value of private information. This is the effect of
Grossman–Stiglitz. Second, a price movement today may reduce the conﬁdence of the
market and generate wider ﬂuctuations in the future, say next period, for a given level
of private private information in that period. Why? In any period, the price is driven
by the trade of newly informed agents (which is obviously a garbled signal), weighted
against the public belief from the history of the market. When the market is more “un-
certain,” that weight from history is reduced with respect to the new trades, and the
price moves more. This effect cannot take place in a Gaussian framework where any
new information reduces the variance of public information and increases the weight
of history. When this second effect dominates the ﬁrst one, a higher level of private
information increases the value of private information and there is strategic comple-
mentarity in the acquisition of private information. The strategic complementarity may
produce multiple equilibria, switches between sharply differentiated regimes of price
ﬂuctuations and trading volume, and “trade frenzies.”
Toprovetheargument, weneedaframeworkwheresomenewscanincreasetheun-
certainty of the information. This property arises in a setting where the fundamental is
eitherina“normal”stateorinastatewherea“shock”hasoccurredinwhichthevalueof
the fundamental is sharply different.1 In this case, it may be taken from an unbounded
distribution, but for simplicity and without any loss of generality, this distribution is re-
duced to one point. By assumption, the fundamental takes one of two values, 1 and 0,
which are normalized to 1 and 0. The conﬁdence of the market is therefore measured
by the variance of the belief (i.e. the probability of state 1 = 1), which at the price p is
p(1 p). The interesting case arises when the conﬁdence is high, that is when the price
is near 1 (or 0) where bad (good) news reduces (increases) the price and augments the
variance.
Agents must use rationally the trade information in a properly functioning ﬁnancial
market.2 The simplest model with this property is perhaps the model of Glosten and
Milgrom (1985). Two features are added: (i) agents who have private information hold
the asset only for one period (but the model could be extended to holdings for a few
periods); (ii) some agents, called information agents, can obtain information about the
fundamental, i.e. invest, at some cost, before entering the market, and their decision
depends on the information3 publicly available at that time.
1For previous studies that depart from the Gaussian framework to generate time-variable uncertainty
see, among others, Detemple (1991), David (1997), Veronesi (1999).
2In Froot et al. (1992), trade orders are executed randomly in the present and in the next period because
of some ad hoc friction. Information about the fundamental is useful in predicting the information of
others who boost the demand and the price in the next period when, by assumption, the other half of
the orders is executed. Agents can learn (at no cost) only one of the two independent components of the
fundamental. There is strategic complementarity on the choice of the signal.
3Dow and Gorton (1994) analyze the efﬁciency of ﬁnancial markets with short-term trading and ex-
ogenous information. In a model of the Glosten–Milgrom type, they make the key assumption that the
probability of an informed agent increases exogenously as the maturity of the asset goes to zero. There is a
ﬁxed cost of trading. When the maturity is long, the probability that the price moves in the right direction
in the next period (because of the occurrence of an informed trader) is small and because of the ﬁxed cost,Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Complementarities in information acquisition 443
The model of sequential trade enables us to derive analytical results. In order to
show the robustness of these results, a model is presented in the Appendix with a con-
tinuum of agents, informed and not informed, who simultaneously place limit orders
in each period. A numerical analysis shows that the main property of strategic comple-
mentarity holds.
Twoperiodsaretheminimumwithshort-termtradeandwebeginwithsuchamodel
in Section 2 in order to show that strategy complementarity may arise between the lev-
els of investment in the same period. If the agent trading in the ﬁrst period happens
to be an information agent, he makes a decision whether to get information about the
fundamental before entering the market. His strategy is the probability  to invest in
information. Since  depends on the public probability of  =1, it is known by the mar-
ket maker, who adjusts the ask and bid accordingly as in the standard Glosten–Milgrom
model with asymmetric information and perfect competition. We analyze how the pay-
off of investment for an information agent depends on  and the public belief about the
fundamental. We show that if the “consensus is strong” before period 1, i.e., if the public
probability of  =1 is near 1 or 0, an increase in  increases the payoff of information.
There is an evident strategic complementarity from the future back to the present:
anincreaseofinformationinvestmentinperiod2(ort +1inageneralmodel),hasapos-
itive impact on the magnitude of the variation of the price in that period and therefore
a positive impact on the value of information in the previous period.
In order to take into account the interactions between the levels of investment in
different periods, the model is extended in Section 3 to an inﬁnite number of periods
where the fundamental is revealed in any period with a vanishingly small probability.
In Section 4, because of the richness of the set of equilibrium strategies, we consider
time-invariant strategies that depend on the last transaction price. As in the two-period
model, if the public belief is sufﬁciently near one or zero, the simultaneous investments
in private information by different agents exhibit strategic complementarity. If the cost
of information is sufﬁciently small, Proposition 5 shows that there is a continuum of
equilibrium strategies where agents follow a trigger strategy: they invest in period t if
and only if the last observed price pt 1 is in some interval (p,p); the values p and
p that deﬁne the trigger strategy are arbitrary within some intervals.
The continuum of equilibria under common knowledge opens the issue of robust-
ness to a perturbation, and the problem of “equilibrium selection.” The model is there-
fore extended in Section 5 with the very plausible assumption that agents, before they
decide whether to get information about the fundamental, observe the last transaction
price with small noise. The model is similar to a “global game” (Carlsson and Damme
1993), with two differences: market-makers have perfect information about the last
transaction price, as suits their specialization, and more important, the iterated elim-
ination of dominated strategies cannot be applied period-by-period separately as in
agents do not trade. Trade begins only when the maturity is sufﬁciently short. Vives (1995) analyzes the in-
formational content of prices with short-term traders in the CARA–Gauss model when private information
is accrued over time and when the fundamental is revealed at the end of the N-period game.444 Christophe Chamley Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
standard models. Since the payoff of investment in any period t depends on the strat-
egy of other agents in period t +1, the iteration has to be implemented backwards and
simultaneously for an arbitrarily large number of periods.
Under a vanishingly small observation noise, there is a unique trigger strategy that
survives the iterated elimination of dominated strategies and is therefore a Strongly
Rational-Expectations Equilibrium (SREE). The relevance of trigger equilibrium strate-
giesisthusvalidated. Theyshowthattheexistenceofacontinuumofequilibriadepends
oncommonknowledgeandisnotrobusttoaperturbation. However,theessentialprop-
erty in multiple equilibria is a discontinuity in the behavior of agents, and that property
is strongly validated in Section 5 where, in the unique equilibrium, the information in-
vestment varies between zero and its maximum as the price crosses an interval that can
be arbitrarily small. With vanishing noise, the level of investment jumps when the price
crosses a threshold value, and the average amplitude of price changes between periods
changes abruptly.4
2. A two-period model
There is a ﬁnancial asset a unit of which is a claim on the fundamental , which is set by
nature before the ﬁrst period and equal to 1 with probability , and to 0 with proba-
bility 1 . Without loss of generality, these values are taken to be 1 = 1 for the “good”
state and 0 = 0 for the “bad” state. As explained in the Introduction, the model could
admit an unbounded distribution of values for the fundamental. The state is invariant
over time. It is not directly observable and is revealed only after the second period.
The ﬁnancial asset is traded in a setting that builds on the model of Glosten and Mil-
grom(1985), andwhichisextendedalong thatlinewithaninﬁnitenumber ofperiodsin
the next section. In the ﬁrst period, a new agent meets a risk-neutral proﬁt-maximizing
market-maker, and either trades one unit of the asset or does not trade. The new agent
is of one of the following three types.
(i) With probability   0, the agent has exogenous private information about the
true state. To simplify, and without loss of generality,5 such an agent is perfectly
informed about . In some speciﬁc cases,  is strictly positive.
(ii) With probability , the agent is an information agent who can get, at a ﬁxed cost
c, information about the true state  before trading. As for the agents of the pre-
vious type, this information is assumed to be perfect: if the agent pays the cost
c, he is said to invest and he gets to know . The investment decision is made at
4In Veronesi (1999), agents are risk-averse and there is a non-linear relation between the asset price and
thepublicbeliefaboutthefundamental. Volatilitydependsontheassetprice. Becauseoftherisk-aversion,
badnewswhenagentsarefairlyconﬁdentaboutahighfundamentalhasastrongimpactbecauseitreduces
this conﬁdence; good news has a weak impact because it also increases the uncertainty. In the present
model, agents are risk-neutral and the price is always equal to the expected value of the fundamental.
5 Imperfectly informed traders may be crowded out of the market into the bid–ask spread, and the anal-
ysis of the equilibrium may be more technical, without additional insight.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Complementarities in information acquisition 445
the beginning of the ﬁrst period, knowing the public belief  about . The strat-
egy of an agent is deﬁned by the probability to invest, 1= with 1 2 [0,], and
the parameter 1 denotes the strategy. An informed agent trades according to his
perfect information, at any price: he buys (sells) when the state is good (bad). An
information agent who is not informed does not trade, because of the spread be-
tween the ask and the bid, in equilibrium. In this section, we focus on the value of
information and assume that 1 is ﬁxed.
(iii) With probability 1  , the agent trades for an exogenous liquidity motive at
any price. He sells, buys one unit, or does not trade, each with probability
1
3. The
issue of endogenous liquidity or hedging traders is discussed brieﬂy in Section 4.
An information agent in the ﬁrst period trades for the short-term: he holds his po-




x, where x = 1 if he buys, x =  1
if he sells, p1 and p2 are the prices of the asset in the two periods, and the expectation
E[p2]is conditional on the information of theagent. All trades take placewith a market-
maker who is perfectly competitive with other market-makers, holds his position until
therevelationofthefundamental,andmaximizeshisexpectedproﬁt. Hencethetrading
price p is equal to the expectation E[], which depends only on the public information
at the time of the trade (including the trade). The market-maker does not know the type
of a new customer but knows the structure of the model and computes rationally the
equilibrium strategy of his customers. As emphasized by Glosten and Milgrom (1985),
informed agents can trade and convey their information to the market because of the
presence of asymmetric information between agent and market-maker.
In the second period, trade takes place in two steps. First, a new “young” agent
comes to the market with a type determined as in the ﬁrst period: with probability , he
is exogenously informed, with probability , he is an information agent in which case
he gets information with probability 2=, and otherwise he is a noise trader. A trade
in that stage has an impact on the price, as in the ﬁrst period. Second, the “old” agent
who traded in the ﬁrst period cancels his position in the second period. This trade is
identiﬁed by the market-maker as the resolution of a previous speculation and has no
impactonthetransactionprice. (Onemayalternativelyassumethatagentscontractthe
holding for one period with market-makers.) The value of  is revealed after the second
period.
2.1 The evolution of the price
Assume ﬁrst that the information investment in each period t (= 1,2), as measured
by t, is given. Let xt 2 f 1,0,1g describe the event that in period t, the agent sells
the asset, does not trade, or buys the asset. In a good state, an informed agent does
not sell and an information agent who has no information does not trade because of
the bid–ask spread. Hence, a sale can be generated only by a noise trader with prob-
ability
1
3(1  ). Similar arguments apply to the other cases. The probabilities of446 Christophe Chamley Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
transactions in the good state ( =1) and the bad state ( =0) are determined by
P(xt = 1j =1)=P(xt = 1j =0)=
1
3(1  )=0
P(xt = 1j =1)=P(xt = 1j =0)=
1
3(1  )++t =0 +t (1)
P(xt = 0j =1)=P(xt = 0j =0)=1 (20 +t),
with t =+t.
The variable t =+t measures the level of information (exogenous and endoge-
nous) of an agent who comes to the market, and depends on the strategy t. This strat-
egy depends only on the public information. Hence, the value of t is common knowl-
edge and is used by the market-maker in the updating of the public belief after the ob-
servation of the transaction xt. The value of t is also equal to the difference between
the probabilities of a purchase and a sale, conditional on the “good” fundamental  =1.
(The case  =0 is symmetric.)
We may assume as a ﬁrst step that t is a ﬁxed parameter. (Its endogenous determi-
nation is analyzed in Section 3.) The public belief at the beginning of period t is equal
to the last period’s price pt 1 (or the last transaction price), with p0 = the initial belief.
Let p+(pt 1,t) and p (pt 1,t) be the values of the price in period t conditional on a















The probability of no trade is the same when  = 1 and  = 0. If there is no trade,
there is no change in the public belief and by an abuse of notation, the price is the price








The evolution of prices is presented in Figure 1 for a case that is most relevant later:
the public belief at the beginning of period t is high, possibly close to 1, and the true
state is bad, contrary to the public belief. One should take t = 1. (The ﬁgure applies
to any period in the inﬁnite horizon model of the next section.) A sale is induced by an
informed agent or noise trader with probability 0 +t and is more likely than a buy,
which is induced only by a noise trade with probability 0.
2.2 The value of information
Consider an agent with a private belief  (which may be derived from public and private
information), who trades in the ﬁrst period and plans to liquidate his position in the
next period. The price in the next period p2 is different from p1 if there is a transaction



































Figure 1. The evolution of the price. The true state is  = 0 and the price is near one. (The
case  = 1, arbitrarily large and with a low belief, is symmetric.) For a description, see the text.




t and the probabilities t are common knowledge and can be





t+1. Movements along the branches are random and determined by the
probabilities o,o +t, etc.
probabilities of a purchase and a sale in period 2, conditional on the good state  = 1,
are 0 +2 and 0 (and vice-versa if  = 0), the value of holding one unit of the asset in
period 1, u(), is the sum of the price p1 and the expected capital gain in each of the two











Because the price p1 satisﬁes the martingale property, we can write the same equation
for the market-maker, who replaces  and u by p1. That equation is subtracted from (4)
and we have
u() p1 =2(p1,2)(  p1). (5)
The absolute value of this expression represents the value of the optimal trade (buy one
unit if u() p1 >0, and sell one unit otherwise).
After the agent acquires information, his belief is either  =1, in which case he buys
at p+
1 , or  = 0, in which case he sells at p 
1 . The probability of his learning that  = 1
is equal to , the public belief at the beginning of period 1. The value of acquiring the












A distinction is made here between +
2 and  
2 , which is the value of 2 after a purchase
or a sale in period 1, in order to have a general expression for the next section, but can448 Christophe Chamley Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
be ignored here. The key effect appears immediately. The value of information at the
beginning of period 1 is an increasing function of the variability of the price in the next
period following each of the two possible prices at the end of period 1. That variability is
measured by the spread in period 2 multiplied by the probability difference between the
events of a buy and a sale, at the high or the low price, in that period. (See Figure 1.)
2.3 Strategic complementarity of investment information within a period
The value of information in (6) depends on the ask and the bid in that period, p+
1 and
p 
1 , which are functions of 1 = +1 in (2). The investment strategy 1 is public in-
formation in a rational expectation equilibrium and is used by the market-maker to set
the bid and the ask. When the investment is higher, the market-maker raises the ask p+
1
and lowers the bid p 
1 in equation (2). This is the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) effect. It
reduces the value of information.
Now consider the impact on the variability of the price p2 as measured by the terms
+
2 (p+
1 ,2) and  
2 (p 
1 , 
2 ). Assume for the discussion that the “initial conﬁdence is
strong,” and that  = p0 is near 1, as in Figure 1. (The case of  near 0 is symmetric.) A
higher ask p+





2 is exogenous in this section.) But if a sale takes place in period 1, the lower
conﬁdence at the beginning of period 2 generates more variability of p2 and a larger
spread, which increases the value of information. When  = p0 is near 1 the two effects
are not symmetric: an increase of conﬁdence when conﬁdence is already high reduces
the value of information by a small amount. But news that reduces the conﬁdence has
an impact on the value of information that will be shown to dominate the combination
of the ﬁrst effect and the Grossman–Stiglitz effect of the previous paragraph.
Omitting the arguments +
2 and  







































where A > 0 is a function of the parameters of the model that is independent of 1. The
right-hand side is positive if 0(21=3  1) < 1. Recall that we must have 0 +1  1. If
0 <
1
2, the interval (0(21=3  1),1 0] is well deﬁned. Since the previous expression is
an approximation when  is near 0 or 1, we have the following result.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Complementarities in information acquisition 449
Proposition 1 (Strategic complementarity within a period). If the noise parameter 0 is
smaller than
1
2, there exist  and  such that if the public belief  at the beginning of
the ﬁrst period is smaller than  or greater than 1 , and the probability of an informed
agent in the ﬁrst period, 1, is greater than , then the value of information is an increas-
ing function of 1.
The upper-bound condition on noise trading is not very restrictive and is intuitive:
if noise trading is large, the trades of the informed agents have little impact on the price.
As the variability of the price becomes smaller, the incentive for a short-term trader to
get information also becomes smaller. Under the conditions of Proposition 1, the payoff
ofanyone’sinvestmentininformationincreasesintheinvestmentmadebyothers: there
is strategic complementarity in getting information within the ﬁrst period.
2.4 Strategic complementarity between periods
A higher information investment in period 2 raises 2 and the variability of investment
2(p1,2) for any p1. This intuitive property is veriﬁed by simple algebra. The higher
variability of the price in period 2 increases the value of information at the beginning of
the previous period 1 (in expression (6)). One has the following result.




level of next period investment, 2, and therefore increasing in +
2 and  
2 .
The increasing value of information may generate multiple equilibria, a trivial prop-
erty at this stage in thetwo-period model. After theexposition of the main mechanisms,
we now consider the setting with an inﬁnite number of periods with an endogenous in-
formation investment in each of them. Proposition 2 shows that the equilibrium levels
of investment in all periods are linked. This non-trivial problem is analyzed in the next
section.
3. Infinite horizon
The model is extended to an inﬁnite number of periods, with a small probability of rev-
elation of the fundamental in each period. This assumption is introduced to obtain a
stationary solution. As before,  is set randomly before the ﬁrst period and is constant
through time. In each period,  is revealed with probability , conditional on no previ-
ous revelation. The value of  is small, in a sense that is made more precise later.
If  is not revealed at the beginning of a period t (with probability 1 ), trading
takes place as in the simple model: a new agent is of one of the three types described
in the previous section, acquires information at a ﬁxed cost c if he can and ﬁnds it prof-
itable, and meets a risk-neutral proﬁt-maximizing market-maker to trade one unit of
the asset or not to trade. The market-maker does not observe the type of the agent but
has rational expectations and can compute the strategy of an information agent, which
is based on public information.450 Christophe Chamley Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
After the new agent meets the market-maker, the “old” agent (who traded in the
previous period), cancels his position and that trade has no impact on the price since
it is identiﬁed as the proﬁt (or loss) taking of a previous speculative trade. The risk-
neutral market-maker trades for the long-term until the eventual revelation of , or for
the short-term (when he may unwind his position with another market-maker in the
nextperiod). Bothassumptionsareequivalentbecauseofthelawofiteratedconditional
expectations with rational agents.6
Since pt 1 summarizes the public information at the beginning of period t, the
strategies of the information agents are assumed to be Markov strategies that are de-
ﬁned by measurable functions Bt(pt 1) from (0,1) to the closed interval [0,]. With-
out loss of generality, all information agents follow the same strategy, which is common
knowledge.
3.1 The evolution of the price and the value of information
If  is not revealed in period t, the trade xt 2 f 1,0,1g deﬁnes a public signal with the
probabilities established in the equations (1) of the simple model. The ask and the bid
are given by the Bayesian equations (2) in the previous section. The proﬁt from a trans-
action xt 2 f 1,1g by an agent with probability assessment  of  = 1 is found as in (5)








the long-term,  =1. We neglect this motive by taking  arbitrarily small. The gain from
trade is not very different from the “pure” short-term gain in the ﬁrst term which, as in





t +1 after a price increase (with a purchase) and a price decrease (with a sale) in period
t. The value of information at the beginning of period t is found as in equation (6) of
























6 Let ht+1 be the history at the end of period t, i.e., the sequence of transactions including that of period
t. If the market-maker holds the asset for one period, then pt =E[jht+1+(1 )E[pt+1jht+1]. Taking the
expectedvalueofthisequationinthenextperiod, E[pt+1jht+1]= E[E[jht+2]+(1 )E[pt+2jht+2]jht+1]=
E[jht+1]+(1 )E[pt+2jht+1]. By iterations over all future periods,pt = E[jht+1]. This equation applies
when the market-maker trades for the long term.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Complementarities in information acquisition 451
The expression ˜ V represents the expected payoff of information investment from
short-term trading and is similar to the expression (6) in the simple model, while L rep-
resents the payoff from long-term trading (for an agent who waits for the revelation of
the fundamental).
The value of V depends on +
t+1 and  
t+1 only through the function ˜ V and one can
show, as in Proposition 2, that ˜ V is increasing in these two variables. It follows imme-
diately that information investment in period t +1 increases the payoff of information
investment at the beginning of period t.
Corollary 1 (Strategic complementarity between periods). Theexpectedvalueofinfor-
mation investment in any period t, V(pt 1,t,+
t+1, 

















The analysis focuses on values of the price above
1
2.
3.3 The impact of the belief from history on the value of information
In the present setting, the uncertainty about the fundamental is measured by its vari-
ance pt 1(1 pt 1). When pt 1 is greater than
1
2, this uncertainty is a decreasing func-
tion of pt 1. There is a positive relation between uncertainty and the value of infor-
mation. This intuitive property is formalized in the next result, which is proved in the
Appendix. Throughout the paper, increasing (decreasing) means strictly increasing (de-
creasing).
Lemma 1. For any probabilities (t,+
t+1, 
t+1) 2 [, + ]3, the value of information
V(pt 1,t,+
t+1, 
t+1)deﬁnedin(7)isdecreasinginpt 1 ifpt 1 > ^ p (increasingif pt 1 <




Because of the interactions between periods, an equilibrium strategy is deﬁned as
a sequence of investment probabilities. We identify such a strategy t= by the prob-
ability t = +t of an informed agent in period t. Any such sequence beginning in
period t must depend on the history up to period t. It is reasonable to assume that this
dependence is only on the public belief at the beginning of period t, which is equal to
pt 1. (Other previous prices could matter as coordination devices for an equilibrium,
but such an assumption would be artiﬁcial.) We consider therefore the following class
of equilibria.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium strategy is deﬁned by a sequence of mea-
surable functions fBt(p)gt1 from (0,1) to [0,] such that for any p 2(0,1),452 Christophe Chamley Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
 if Bt(p)=0, then V(p,Bt(p),+
t+1, 
t+1)c
 if 0< Bt(p)<1, then V(p,Bt(p),+
t+1, 
t+1)=c














An equilibrium strategy Bt in period t depends on the strategy Bt+1 in the next pe-
riod. In general, the structure of equilibria is complex. We focus on stationary strategies
where the function Bt does not depend on t; this class is sufﬁciently rich, and, under
imperfect information (Section 5), the unique equilibrium is a stationary strategy.
4. Stationary equilibrium strategies
We have seen in Lemma 1 that the information payoff is decreasing in p if p is high, and
increasing if p is low. It is therefore natural to consider strategies in which an informa-
tion agent invests if and only if the price is in some interval (p,p).
Definition 2 (Trigger strategy). A (stationary) trigger strategy is deﬁned by an invest-
ment interval7 (p,p) such that B(p)=1 if p 2(p,p), and B(p)=0 if p = 2(p,p).
Since there is a symmetry between the high and the low value of p (equation (9)), we
focusonthedeterminationoftheupper-endoftheinvestmentinterval, p. Thevalueof
information in period t depends on the level of information investment in period t +1,
which depends on the price pt. Assume that pt 1 is near or at p. If the information
agent learns that  = 1, he buys at the ask p+
t which is above p and, by deﬁnition of
the stationary strategy, there is no information investment in the next period. If he sells
at the bid, the price pt is in the investment interval and t+1 = . We are thus led to
introduce zero-one expectations such that +
t+1 =  and  
t+1 = +. Under zero-one





with f W(p,)= ˜ V(p,+,,+), deﬁned in (8).
Theexpression f W(p,)deﬁnesthepayoffofinformationwithpureshort-termtrade
and zero-one expectations as a function of the last transaction price p and the informa-
tion investment  in the current period. We ﬁrst analyze the properties of this function.
We later show that the component from long-term trade, L(p,), can be neglected if
 is sufﬁciently small. The next result shows that under some assumptions, the payoff
from pure short-term trade generates strategic complementarities.
7 The interval (p,p) is open, but one could include boundaries without altering the equilibrium since
the price is at one of the boundaries with zero probability.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Complementarities in information acquisition 453
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Figure 2. Continuum of constant equilibria. The function W(p,) is the ex ante value of infor-
mation for a last transaction price equal to p, a level of investment this period equal to  2[0,]
and investment equal to  (0) if the price this period goes up (down).
Proposition 3. For given  and  with  < =3, there exists p such that for any p 2
(p,1), the value of information with pure short-term trading and zero-one expectations,
f W(p,), deﬁned in (10), is decreasing in p and increasing in .
The ﬁrst part of the result is proved as Lemma 1. The second part, which is proved in
the Appendix, holds only if the exogenous level of information  is not too large relative
to the range of values of the endogenous information, . Such an assumption is not
surprising: a higher value of  generates a higher ask and a lower bid by the rational
market-maker, which reduces the payoff of information investment.
The properties of the function f W(p,) in Proposition 3 are illustrated in Figure 2,
where we can replace W by f W. From Proposition 3 and since for given , f W(p,) is
decreasing to 0 when p tends to 1, if c is not too high, the equation f W(p,0) = c has
a unique solution ˜ pL such that ˜ pL > p, where p is deﬁned in Proposition 3. In this
case, there is another solution ˜ pH such that f W( ˜ pH,) = c as represented in Figure 2
(where we can substitute ˜ pL for pL and ˜ pH for pH). If the probability of revelation 
is sufﬁciently small, then the function f W with pure short-term trading approximates
arbitrarily closely the payoff of information W and Figure 2 applies to the graph of the
function W(p,). This is the meaning of the next result.
Proposition 4. Assuming  < =3, there exists c such that if c < c, then there is  such






>c if p 2[
1
2,())
<c if p 2((),1),
@ W(p,)
@ 
>0 if p 2[pL,pH] with W(pL,0)=W(pH,)=c.
Choose a value p 2 (pL,pH) as represented in the ﬁgure, and a value p 2 (1 pH,
1 pL) (in the low range that is not represented). The next result shows that the trigger
strategy (p,p) deﬁnes an equilibrium.
Proposition 5. Under the assumptions of Proposition 4, there is a continuum of sta-
tionary equilibrium strategies: any pair fp,pg such that p 2 [pL,pH] and p 2
[1 pH,1 pL], where fpL,pHg is deﬁned in Proposition 4, deﬁnes a trigger strategy that
is an equilibrium strategy.
The sufﬁcient conditions for the existence of a continuum of equilibrium strategies
are simple: the cost of information should be smaller than some value, traders should
sufﬁciently care about the short-term proﬁts, and the occurrence of exogenously in-
formed agents should not be too high compared to that of the traders for whom infor-
mation is endogenous.
4.1 Remarks
4.1.1 The case of high information cost When c is sufﬁciently large (but not too large),
the solution ˜ pL of f W( ˜ pL,0) = c may be smaller than p and Propositions 3 and 4 may
not apply. In this case, there may be strategic substitutability and a unique equilibrium
strategy. If p is greater than some value p, there is no information acquisition. If the
price decreases from p, information investment increases gradually, possibly up to its
maximum : the strategy for an information agent is to randomize with an increasing
probability to acquire information as the price decreases. (If the price becomes lower
than
1
2, investment in information decreases.) The detailed analysis of this case is not
the main focus in this paper and is left aside.
4.1.2 Heterogeneouscostsofinformation Wehaveassumedforsimplicitythatallagents
havethesamecostofinformation,buttheequilibriumpropertiesarerobustwhenthere
is some cost heterogeneity. Suppose that an information agent can acquire information
at the ﬁxed cost c, which is an increasing function c() for  2 [0,], with c(0) > 0. The
distribution of costs is represented by a density function over  on the interval [0,].
An information agent is now characterized by a random draw from this distribution. If
there is strategic complementarity, Proposition 4 holds with a minor alteration: pL and
pH are deﬁned by W(pL,0)=c(0) and W(pH,)=c(). If there is strategic substitution,
the equilibrium strategy becomes deterministic with a threshold value c. The observed
investment in information is still random because of the random determination of the
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4.1.3 Convergence The public belief is equal to the price of the asset and is a bounded
martingale, hence it converges. If the probability of an exogenously informed agent 
is strictly positive, the price converges to the value of the fundamental. If there is no
exogenously informed agent and  = 0, the price does not converge to the true value
because the value of information would tend to zero while the cost of information is
strictly positive.
4.1.4 Endogenoushedging Theassumptionofexogenousnoisetraderscanbereplaced
by the assumption of traders who hedge against an exogenous source of individual
income that is correlated with the fundamental. Adapting the model of Dow (2004),
one can assume that hedgers trade one unit of the asset and are differentiated by the
marginal utility of income in the good and bad states. The cost of hedging increases
with the bid–ask spread. When information agents buy more information, the widening
of the spread crowds some hedgers out of trade. This effect increases the information
content and the variability of the prices and therefore the value of information. It rein-
forcesthestrategiccomplementarityandtherangeofparametervaluesforacontinuum
of equilibria.8
5. Imperfect information and equilibrium uniqueness
Thepropertyofmultipleequilibriaisindicativeofpotentiallylargechangesintheevolu-
tionoftheprice, butitleavesopentheproblemofcoordinatingonthestrategyfp,pg,
since there is a continuum of such values. Furthermore, one should check that the
property is robust to a perturbation. In this section, we introduce an observation noise,
which can be vanishingly small, on the history of prices. The game is then dominance
solvable under some minor additional assumption speciﬁed below: there is a unique
strategy that survives the iterated elimination of dominated strategies and is therefore
a Strongly Rational-Expectations Equilibrium (SREE) (Guesnerie 2002). That strategy is
one of the trigger strategies analyzed in the previous section.
The setting is similar to the one-period global game of Carlsson and Damme (1993),
with a notable difference however: since the optimal strategy in any period t depends
on the strategy in period t +1, the eductive argument that eliminates strategies has to
be applied backwards through time for all periods.
By assumption, the information agent who comes to the market in period t knows
imperfectly the last transaction price pt 1: his private information is the signal
st =pt 1 +t,
where t is independently drawn from a distribution with support [ ,]. The analysis
holds for any nondegenerate distribution of t, but to simplify  has a uniform distribu-
tion. Thepriordistributiononpt 1 iscommonknowledgeandwithoutlossofgenerality
is assumed to be uniform.9
8In Dow (2004), the endogenous hedging may be sufﬁcient to generate a discrete set of multiple
equilibria.
9When  is arbitrarily small, the density of the prior pt 1 is nearly uniform for a given st. The important456 Christophe Chamley Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
Market-makershaveperfectinformationasbeﬁtstheirrole. (Anoisyobservationon
their part would probably not change the results.) The other parameters of the model
are the same as in Section 4 without observation noise, and are assumed to satisfy the
assumptions in Proposition 4.
If an information agent, after observing his signal st, does not invest in information,
he stays out of the market and does not trade because of the bid–ask spread, as in the
case with no observation noise. If he invests at the cost c, he learns the exact value
of the fundamental , and trades whatever the equilibrium prices. A strategy is now a
measurable function of the signal st and the level of the investment t of any “other”
information agent who may be called to the market in the same period.
The strategy t is rationally anticipated by the market-maker. Since he knows the
price pt 1, he can compute the distribution of private signals and using the probability
offacinganinformedagent,hesetsthebidandasktomaximizehisexpectedproﬁtfrom
trade, as in the previous sections. We do not restrict the strategy to be a trigger strategy,
but the payoff with a trigger strategy is a useful tool. In a trigger strategy, an information
agent invests if his signal is in some interval (^ s0,^ s). We focus on the behavior of agents
near the value ^ s, which is shown to be in the interval (pL,pH). Without loss of generality,
we may assume that ^ s0 =1  ^ s, and the trigger strategy is deﬁned by ^ s. For  sufﬁciently











In the model with perfect information, we used the payoff function W(p,) with the
zero-one expectations that in the period after a price rise (at the ask), there is no infor-
mation investment, whereas after a transaction at the bid, investment is at the maxi-
mum . A similar function plays an important role here.
An information agent with signal s has a subjective probability of state  = 1 equal
to (s) and a density function (pjs) on the last transaction price p. Assuming that he
haszero-oneexpectationsaboutthenextperiodinvestment,andthatthemarket-maker
anticipates the strategy ^ s, by extension of (6), the payoff of information is equal to the
function
















assumption is that the prior of an information agent has a support that includes an open interval that
includes the interval [1 pH,pH].Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Complementarities in information acquisition 457
where p+ =p+(p,+(p,^ s)), p  =p (p,+(p,^ s)), + =,   =+, and (p,^ s) is
given by (11). The functions ˜ J(s,^ s) and K(s,^ s) and are continuous and have continu-
ous partial derivatives.


























5.1 Vanishingly small observation noise










where W(s,) is deﬁned in (10). Using the differentiability of the Bayesian functions p+













These equations show that for  arbitrarily small, the function J(s,s) is approximated
by an average of the functions W(s,). The next result follows from the properties of
W(p,) in Propositions 4 and 5.
Lemma 2. Under the assumptions of Proposition 4, there exists ^  such that if  < ^ ,
the equation J(s,s) = c has a unique solution s on the interval [pL,1]. Furthermore,

























































with =+. Equation (14) follows with the expression of J in (12) and K in (13).458 Christophe Chamley Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
s s∗
c





Figure 3. The value of information J(s,s) at the threshold s of a trigger strategy, and iterated
dominance. J(s,s) is the value of information for an agent with signal s when other agents
invest only if their signals are greater than s. For a discussion, see the proof of Proposition 6 in
the Appendix.
The function J(s,s) replaces the function W(p,) that was used with perfect informa-
tion. It is represented in Figure 3, which illustrates the following iterative dominance
argument.
In the ﬁrst step, there is a value of the private signal s1 such that if s > s1, the agent
is sufﬁciently conﬁdent that the state is good and the value of information is below
the cost c even if all other agents invest. Investment is dominated, which implies that
J(s1,s1) < c. When agents with a signal higher than s1 do not invest in period T, T ar-
bitrary, the value of investment in period T   1 is bounded above by the value under
zero-one expectations, which is J(s,s1). By continuity of J, J(s,s1) < c on an interval
(s2,s1]. Hence, investment is dominated in period T  1 for s < s2 if it is dominated in
period T for s > s1. The argument is used iteratively for the following result, which is
proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 6. Assume c and  such that Proposition 4 holds, and  > 0. There exists 
such that if  <,
(i) investment is iteratively dominated for any s > s where s 2 (pL,pH) is deﬁned by






(ii) there exists a value ^ c  c (deﬁned in Proposition 3), such that if c < ^ c and  < ,
then for s 2(1 s,s), not to invest in information is iteratively dominated. In thisTheoretical Economics 2 (2007) Complementarities in information acquisition 459
case the strategy to invest if and only s 2(1 s,s) is a SREE. (It is the only strategy
to survive the iterated elimination of dominated strategies.)
The proposition introduces two minor assumptions: the restriction  > 0 ensures
that the variation of the price after a transaction has a strictly positive lower bound.
This lower bound ensures that zero-one expectations apply to an agent near a threshold
value s: if he buys (sells), he is sure that for  sufﬁciently small, all information agents
in the next period will have a signal strictly higher (lower) than s and by deﬁnition of s
willnotinvest(willinvest)ininformation. Therestrictiononthecostc inPart(ii)isused
to ensure that information investment is dominant if the price is near
1
2. This restriction
can be removed if we assume that agents use a trigger strategy in some period.
6. Conclusion
We began by showing that the combination of short-term trades and endogenous infor-
mation generates strategic complementarities, and that these complementarities may
be sufﬁciently strong to generate a continuum of equilibria when agents have common
knowledge of the last transaction price. Each equilibrium deﬁnes regions of prices with
sharply different levels of investment. When the price crosses a threshold, the level of
investment is discontinuous because of the strategic complementarity.
Under small imperfect information, the continuum is reduced to a singleton, but
there is no contradiction between the results without observation noise. The important
property is the discontinuity of the information investment. The multiplicity of equi-
libria is not robust to a perturbation with observation noise, but the discontinuity in
behavior is robust.
Take an initial price near near 1 and a fundamental equal to 0. Eventually, the price
must decrease (since it converges to the truth). When agents observe perfectly the his-
tory, the price enters a region with multiple equilibrium strategies with zero or maxi-
mum investment. When the observation of history is subject to a noise, however small,
Proposition 6 states that the level of investment grows from zero to its maximum when
the price crosses the interval [S   ^ ,S + ^ ], which is arbitrarily small.
There is a linear relation in the model between the probability of a trade and the
level of endogenous information. Hence, in the equilibrium there is a positive relation
between the volume of trade and the information that is generated by the market. In-
formation frenzy is equivalent to trade frenzy.
The mechanism presented here is robust for other models of micro-structure, as
veriﬁed numerically in the Appendix for standard model with a continuum of agents
who place simultaneous limit orders in the same period.
A next step is to consider small random changes of the fundamental.11 One may
anticipate that the present results will be extended and that in an equilibrium, there
will be random switches between two regimes with sharply different levels of trade and
information.
11David (1997) analyzes the learning process in a ﬁnancial market when the state switches randomly
between discrete values and agents have exogenous private information.460 Christophe Chamley Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The value function V is deﬁned in (7), which is repeated here:


























t are increasing in pt 1. Since p 
t >
1
2 under the assumption in the




t+1), are decreasing in pt 1.
A small exercise shows that pt 1(1 p+




t is decreasing in pt 1 if p 
t > 1 pt 1, which is satisﬁed by the assumption
of the lemma (p 
t >
1
2 >1 pt 1). The last part of the lemma follows from the symmetry
in (9). 
Proof of Proposition 3. The ﬁrst part of the proposition was proved in Lemma 2. Re-
call the deﬁnition of W(p,) in (10):
W(p,)=(1 )f W(p,)+L(p,) with =+.
Weﬁrstprovethattheshort-termcomponentoftheinformationvalueexhibitsstrategic
complementarity(@ f W(p,)=@ >0),andthenshowthatthelong-termcomponentcan
be ignored if  is sufﬁciently small. The short-term component is given in (8) for any
























Using (2) and setting  = +, +
t+1 = , and  
t+1 = + because of the deﬁnition of
W(p,), replace pt 1 by p, and omit the time subscript because there is no ambiguity:











where D1(p,)=0 +p and D2 =0 +(1 p) are the denominators in (2).Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Complementarities in information acquisition 461
























This expression is negative if p >
1
2, as beﬁts the intuition: good news in period t in-
creases the level of conﬁdence and decreases the variability of the price in the next pe-
































Combining the two previous expressions, if p tends to 1, then H(p,) = a0
 +b0








If <=3, there exists 0 >0. Hence, there exists p such that if p >p, then for all p >p,
H 0
 >0=2>0. Because of (15), a similar inequality applies to f W 0
. 
Proof of Proposition 4. From the text that precedes Proposition 4, we have the fol-
lowing result.
Lemma 3. Thereexistsc suchthatif c <c,thentheequation f W( ˜ (),)=c hasaunique
solution for  2[0,], ˜ ()2[
1
2,1], and we have the following properties:
(i) f W(p,)>c for p 2[
1
2, ˜ ()), f W(p,)<c for p 2( ˜ (),1).
(ii)
@ f W(p,)
@  >0 if p  ˜ (0).
Deﬁne ˜ pL = (0), and ˜ pH = ˜ (). The functions f W(p,) and L(p,) and their
derivatives are continuous for (p,) 2 (
1
2,1)[0,], therefore uniformly continuous on
any compact subset of (
1
2,1)[0,]. There is an open interval (^ p0, ^ p) containing [ ˜ pL, ˜ pH]
suchthatfollowingProposition3, @ ˜ W(p,)=@ p hasastrictlynegativeupperboundand
@ f W(p,)=@  has a strictly positive lower bound for ^ p0  p  ^ p and 0    . One can
choose  such that (i) applies to the function W and (ii) applies also if p is not in an
arbitrarily small interval that contains 1. 462 Christophe Chamley Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose ﬁrst pt 1 > p. By deﬁnition of the strategy p, no
information agent invests in period t. Consider the payoff of a deviating agent who
invests. If after paying the cost c, he learns that  = 1, then he buys at p+
t > pt 1 > p.
By the deﬁnition of the strategy p, no agent invests in the next period and +
t+1 = 0.
We do not need to be concerned by the outcome if he learns that  = 0 because of the
strategiccomplementarityfromperiodt+1toperiodt: fromProposition2,thepayoffof
investmentinperiodt isnotgreaterthanift+1 =. Thepayoffofinvestmentinperiod
t is therefore bounded above by the payoff under zero-one expectations, W(pt 1,0) <
W(pL,0)=c, using Proposition 4 and the deﬁnition of pL in that proposition.
Suppose now that
1
2  pt 1 < p: any information agent invests in period t. We
consider again a deviating agent who invests. If he learns that  = 0, he trades at the
bid p (pt 1,). Using the property of p,
1
2 < p (pt 1,) and  
t+1 = +. Again using
Corollary 1, the payoff of investment in period t is now bounded below by the payoff
under zero-one expectations, W(p,), which is strictly greater than c. 
Proof of Proposition 6. To prove the result, one begins with a region of dominance.
If s is sufﬁciently close to 1, for small  the agent is sure that the price is close to 1 and
thevalueofinformationislowerthanthecost. Thereisavalues1 suchthatforanyagent
with a signal s 2(s1,1), investment is dominated. The interval (s1,1) is now extended by
iterations to the left.
A critical step in the case of perfect information is the use of zero-one expectations
about the next period investment. Under imperfect information, an agent cannot be
sure about the transaction price and therefore the distribution of agents in the next pe-
riod. But under the trivial assumption  > 0, if the heterogeneity is sufﬁciently small,
which is the desirable case, it is dwarfed by the price movement and an individual with
signal s is sure that if he makes a transaction, any information agent in the next period
will be “to the right” or “to the left” by a quantum step. This is the meaning of the fol-
lowing lemma, which is easy to establish,12 and which illustrated by Figure 4.
Lemma 4. If  > 0, there exist ^ 1 and  > 0 such that if  < ^ 1, then for any s1 and s
with
1
2 <s0 <1, and s 2(1 s1,s1), an agent with signal s is sure that if he buys (sells), the
signal of any agent in the next period will be greater than s + (smaller than s  ).
Choose an arbitrary period T (which is large in a sense deﬁned below). In that pe-
riod, information investment is dominated for s 2 (s1,1). Consider now an agent in pe-
riod T  1 with a signal s in a neighborhood of s1, as illustrated in Figure 4. By Lemma 4,
that agent is sure that if he buys, any information agent in the next period has a signal
higherthans1 andthereforedoesnotinvest, bydeﬁnitionofs1. Ifhesells, thepricefalls,
investment in the next period may not be known, but we can use the strategic comple-
mentarityfromperiodT toperiodT  1(Corollary1)toputanupperboundonhisvalue
of information, which is therefore not greater than under zero-one expectations (zero
investment next period if the agent gets a good signal and buys, maximum investment
if he sells). The payoff of information is bounded above by the function J(s,s1).
12 Choose ^ 1 <=3 and <=3, where  is the lower bound of the price change when s 2[1 s1,s1].Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Complementarities in information acquisition 463
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Figure 4. Iterated elimination of dominated strategies. While s moves a little to the left from s,
the levels of investment in the next period do not change.
Since J is continuous and J(s1,s1) < c, there is a value s2 such that for any s 2
(s2,s1), J(s,s1) < c and s2 > s1  , where  is deﬁned in Lemma 4. The argument is
illustrated in Figure 3. After this ﬁrst step, investment is dominated for an agent with
signal s 2 (s2,s1] in period T  1. Because investment is dominated for s 2 (s1,1) for any
period, it is dominated for s 2(s2,1) in period T  1 and therefore in any period (since T
is arbitrary).
Repeating the argument for any period T  k  1 and taking T arbitrarily large, we
construct a sequence fskgk1 that is decreasing,13 bounded below by s, and thus con-
verging to some ^ s  s. If ^ s > s, a small exercise that uses the continuity of J(s,s)
shows that the differences sk 1  sk are bounded below by a strictly positive number,
which yields a contradiction. Hence, for any s >s, the information investment is dom-
inated after a ﬁnite number of iterations. This proves Part (i).
For Part (ii), we need to ﬁnd an interval of “medium values” of the private signals







Because of the continuity of the function V, which is increasing with respect to its last
two arguments (Corollary 1), M(
1
2)>0.




2 +0) for some value of 0 > 0.
Take ^ c in Proposition 6 to be the minimum of c1 and the value c deﬁned in Proposi-
tion 4. Then there exists s0 >
1
2 such that an agent with signal s 2 [1   s1,s1] is sure
that the value of information is higher than the cost c, independently of the strategies
of others. One then uses an iterative argument as in Part (i) to generate an increasing
sequence fskgk1 that converges to s, such that investment is a dominating strategy for
any interval (1 sk,sk). 
13In Figure 3, s1  s2 =s2  s3 = but s4 >s3   and J(s4,s3)=c.464 Christophe Chamley Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
A.2 A model with simultaneous trading by a continuum of agents
In order to show that the increasing value of information holds in a standard structure
with a continuum of agents, a two-period model is sufﬁcient. As in Section 2, there are
two possible values of the fundamental, 0 = 0 and 1 = 1. An informed agent receives
a signal si =  + , where   N (0,2). He is risk-neutral but his trade is limited in
absolute value by a bound, which is normalized to one. The mass of informed traders in
period 1 is 1 = , which is variable, and in period 2, with new agents, 2 = , which is
ﬁxed.
In any period t, the demand is the sum of the demand by newly informed agents,
noise traders,Qt which is normally distributed N (0,!2), and market-makers, as in the
standard model of a ﬁnancial market with a continuum of agents. Market-makers are
risk-neutral, hence the equilibrium price is also the probability assessment of the state
 = 1. In a rational expectation equilibrium, the observation of the market price is
equivalent to the observation of the demand of informed agents plus that of the noise
traders, Yt = tXt()+Qt, where Xt() is the average demand of informed agents. The
realization Yt provides a signal of . As in Section 2, the informed traders of period 1
cancel their positions after the equilibrium of period 2, with no impact on the price p2,
before the revelation of the fundamental.
The task is to determine the value of acquiring the signal s in the ﬁrst period given
the initial belief, 0. This value V(1) depends on the mass of informed agents in
period 1.
An agent who has the signal s also observes the market price. He is more optimistic
than the market if his signal is good, that is if s >s =(0 +1)=2=. An exercise shows
that our risk-neutral agent who is constrained on his trade and holds his position only
for one period, buys (sells) up to the constraint when he is more (less) optimistic than




















The demand per informed agent is constant in absolute value, positive if  =1.
Given the form of X(), the market signal Yt = tX() +Qt can be replaced by
Zt = t +Qt, where Qt has a normal distribution N (0,!2). This variable is itself ob-
servationally equivalent to  +Qt=t. In this form, one sees immediately that the signal
to noise ratio that is provided by the market increases with the proportion of informed
agents.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Complementarities in information acquisition 465










Mass of informed agents
Value of information
Figure 5. Value of information with a continuum of traders in each period.






























with =1  0 and  =
1
2(1 +0).
Recalling that 2 is ﬁxed, his value of the ﬁnancial asset at the end of period 1 is
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where p2(Q2;2,p1,) is given in (17).
















where  and f are the densities of  andQ1. The function V(;p0) is computed numer-
ically for the following values of the parameters: !=1,  =0.5, 2 =1, p0 =0.92.
The graph of the function is represented in Figure 5. If the investment in private
information is not too large, the value of information is increasing and there is strategic
substitutability in the acquisition of information. When  is large, the function V() is
decreasingasinthemodelofsequentialtradinginthetext,andforthesamereason. One
can also verify that the range of  for which V is increasing is larger when the price p0
increases towards 1. (The level of the value of information is obviously smaller.) For the
parametersofFigure5,thereissomestrategiccomplementarityifp0 >0.75orp0 <0.25.
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